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ABSTRACT 
To finance their growth and value creation, agricultural co-operatives have at their disposal several financial 
instruments: equity, quasi-equity or debt. Many of these instruments are particularly innovative and have been 
designed specifically for co-operatives. In France, only recently have some co-operatives expanded their types of 
financing to include external funders through the issue of OTC- or publicly-traded securities.  
Agricultural co-operatives' governance and economic projects are often misunderstood by external financial 
investors. The risk of conflicts of interest plays a role in these misunderstandings in the way retained earnings, 
returns to agricultural products brought by co-op member and returns to equity capital. Such risks are identified 
and answers are proposed. 
Keywords. co-operative; agricultural co-operative ; financing ; financial instrument ; conflict of interest; 
shareholder 
 
 
1 Introduction  
The objective of the paper is to identify risks of conflicts of interests related to  the financing of French 
agricultural co-operatives. The governance of agricultural co-operatives (co-ops) is not well understood by 
external financial investors (funds and investment bankers). Potential conflicts of interest are important. 
These two points affect the development of co-operatives.  
To finance their development, agricultural co-operatives have financial instruments in equity, quasi-equity 
and debt funds. Several of these instruments are innovative. Solutions are proposed to prevent conflicts 
of interest identified between co-operative members and external financial investors. A co-operative may 
adopt governance mechanisms with clear property rights and satisfying way of remuneration for each 
stakeholder. And it is possible to strengthen the common interests of co-operative members and outside 
investors, which is innovative.  
The paper is organized as follows. First, a literature review identifies the specific challenges and 
constraints to raise equity. Recovery is also literature on the specif ics of co-operative share capital and its 
impact on financial governance. Then it presents the usual modes of financing co -operatives and most 
innovative instruments, using external financial investors. Then it analyzes the potential conflicts of 
interest between co-operative members and external financial investors. Finally, solutions are proposed.  
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2 Literatu re review: stakes and constraints to lever equity capital 
Agricultural co-operatives face constraints in raising capital because of their governance, property rights 
and limited return on equity. Modes of governance of collective enterprises have a strong influence on 
financial resources for value creation (Malo and Vézina, 2004). Cook (1995) , Hendrikse and Verman 
(2001), Royer (1999) and van Bekkum (1997) observe that the strategies of agricultural co-operatives have 
been affected by their limited access to capital and partly because they are not publicly traded.  
Limited equity remuneration penalizes agricultural co-operatives raising equity (Cobia and Brewer, 1989). 
The co-operative members are often the only providers of equity (Staatz, 1987). Property rights are often 
unclear. Several co-operative models have emerged with property rights defined more clearly in Canada 
(Coté, 2001) and the USA (Chaddad and Cook, 2004), paving the way for attracting external shareholders. 
But Chaddad and Cook (2004) found that the constraints on access to capital in the U.S. remain. Hailu 
(2012) made the same observation in Canada.  
Van der Krogt et al. (2007) showed that alliances and mergers and acquisitions of dairy co-operative 
strategies in Europe can be explained by risk aversion and access to capital constraints. Arising from 
mergers, the top 10 European co-operative groups have financed their development by opening their 
capital to other investors and Ireland co-op farmers have lost the power to the financial investors 
(Mauget, 2011).  
For Filippi and Triboulet (2011), Mauget (2011), Thévenot (2011) and Chomel et al. (2013) governance of 
the co-operative with voting rights associated with co-operative differs from that co-operative group’s 
subsidiary that is usually an investor-owned corporation. The governance of investor-owned corporation 
includes rights to vote according to the amount of equity capital. So such a co-op subsidiary may attract 
external financial investors but it may keep co-op members from the management of a subsidiary of co-
op. 
3 The specificity of share capital in co-operatives 
The specificity of share capital in co-operatives is based on the general principles developed by the 
International Co-operative Alliance (1995) and mentioned in the declaration of Manchester. 
3.1 Status of share capital social provided by co-op members 
Share capital of co-ops is ruled under specific principles: limited rate of return, no capital gain, risks in 
case of co-op financial distress. 
In France, the law of September 10, 1947 defines a specific status for co-operatives. And the law of August 
27, 1972 states that "…agricultural co-operatives and their unions are a special category of companies, 
separate from civil societies and corporations. They have legal personality and full capacity…" and their 
share capital is variable (Koulytchizky and Mauget, 2003; Draperi, 2012).  
Following Vienney (1980), Deshayes (1988) uses the agency theory to analyze the modes of governance. A 
co-operative differs from an investor-owned corporation whose risky product is the equity capital 
provided by shareholders. The share capital, held by co-op members, is a property right and an operating 
right for an economic act together with other members: collection, processing and sale of agricultural 
products, production and sale of purchase of farm inputs and services. The co-operative aims at 
maximizing the price of the agricultural product provided by co-op members. The risky product is the 
price of agricultural products brought by co-op members to the co-op. 
3.2 Limited remuneration of co-op share capital and formation of net income 
Co-op members subscribe shares in proportion to the operating activity carried out with the co-op in 
exchange for a commitment to activity. The remuneration of equity capital in co-operatives is limited. In 
France, under Article 14 of the 1947 Act, the rate of return on share capital in co-operatives is limited to 
the average yield of bonds in investor-owned corporations (TMO). TMO, published by the Ministry of 
Economy (2014), was worth 2.38% for the first half of 2014. Co-op shares are not entitled to a capital gain 
and are redeemed at face value. 
For corporations, equity share gives right to dividend and a share of retained earnings in proportion to the 
amount of the share capital. In co-operatives, net income is different from net income in corporations 
(Mevellec and Bellay, 1975). In co-operatives, the price of agricultural products supplied by co-operators 
is decided by the Board and approved by the General Assembly. Operating income and net income of co-
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ops depend on a political decision made by co-op members. They do not just depend on agricultural 
market prices and costs of co-ops. 
3.3 Risks related to co-op member’s share capital 
In case of liquidation of a co-operative, a co-op member may be financially liable for the debt of his/her 
co-op for a minimum amount equal of twice its share capital. When leaving the co-operative, the 
reimbursement of his/her share capital may be reduced by his/her share of losses not charged to retained 
earnings.  
In contrast, a shareholder of a corporation may only lose up to the amount of his/her equity capital, but 
not further. 
4 Financing of co-operatives and financial capital from external investors  
Co-operatives may raise use different types of financial instruments to face their financial needs in order 
to invest. They may use equity, quasi-equity and debt capital.  
4.1 Share capital of co-operatives and financial capital provided by external investors 
Co-operative shares are neither negotiable nor listed on stock exchange: a co-op member cannot sell 
his/her equity capital. His/her amount of shares is related to his/her agricultural activity and transmitted 
to his/her successor at the head of the farm. When leaving the co-operative, he/she may ask for 
reimbursement. Co-operative repays member’s share capital, generally 5 years after the departure of co -
op member, at face value if its economic and financial situation allows it. 
A co-op member, who leaves the co-operative, cannot claim a share of the retained earnings, which do 
not allow capital appreciation. The statute of agricultural co-operatives requires retained earnings to 
remain undivided. 
By contrast, the shares of investor-owned corporations may be negotiable by individual and legal persons 
on stock exchange. Share market value incorporates the value of retained earnings.  
4.2 Traditional financing of co-operatives 
According to Mauget (1991) working on equity capital, a co-operative can usually:  
(a) up share capital from co-op members in proportion to their operating business with the co-operative,  
(b) up share capital from co-op associates (but not members) with economic activity made with the co-
operative, if the articles of the co-operative permit,  
(c) obtain investment subsidies,  
(d) set aside retained earnings as a portion of the surplus on the decision of co-op board which must be 
approved by co-op members in general assembly. 
Co-op shares, retained earnings and investment subsidies remain undivided and are not distributed. So, 
they sustain the activity of co-ops from a generation of farmers to the next one. In case of dissolution of a 
co-operative, co-op shares, retained earnings, and investment subsidies are part of the net assets whose 
balance after payment of debts and repayment of capital remains non-shareable. 
Bank loans are commonly used by co-operatives. 
4.3 Equity securities possibly involving external financial investors  
To strengthen the solvency of co-operatives that want to expand, the French legislator has allowed them 
to eventually raise money from external financiers by creating the following securities:  
(a) equity securities such as co-operative investment certificates (certificats co-opératifs d’investissement 
CCI), shares with particular advantages (parts sociales à avantages particuliers PSAP) and savings shares 
(parts sociales d’épargne PSE) to their members, 
(b) hybrid securities such as equity securities (titres participatifs TP) by calling public savings. 
Established in 1987, a co-operative investment certificate (CCI) is a title without voting right. It is issued 
by a mutual company or co-operative. It can be traded and listed. Its rate of return is greater than or 
equal to that of shares without exceeding the maximum rate of return on equity capital. CCI may be 
issued to external financiers. 
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Created in 1992 and revised in 2006, shares with particular advantages (PSAP) are intended to:  
(a) strengthen capital, by issuing shares for this purpose or by conversion of shares held by the 
shareholders, beyond their statutory commitment,  
(b) raise co-op members’ interest to the development of their investor-owned corporation subsidiaries 
that can deliver dividends to co-op members. 
PSAP, whose amount is limited to half of the share capital, is accessible to all co-op members and co-op 
associates. As co-operative shares, PSAP do not provide additional voting rights or additional retained 
earnings. The advantages are defined by co-op statute:  
(a) priority to pay interest to such shares,  
(b) a rate of return which is limited to the rate of return on co-op shares with a maximum of 2%, 
(c) possibility to get dividends from co-op subsidiaries  
(d) limited responsibility to the amount of PSAP share in case of co-op liquidation, and 
(e) reduced schedule of repayment to be defined by any co-operative issuing such instruments. 
Established in 2006, savings shares (PSE) are derived from the distribution of net earnings to co-op 
members in proportion to their operating activity with the co-operative or a co-operative union. Co-
operative associates, but not members, will not have access. PSE have the same face value as other co-op 
shares and give the same right to returns. It is a capitalization of retained earnings in the form of shares to 
co-operative members. Co-operatives strengthen their equity capital without outflow of money. 
4.4 Equity capital of co-operatives with subsidiaries 
A co-operative may also generate capital through the issue of shares made by a subsidiary which is a 
corporation. These corporate shares may be traded. So, co-ops may take advantage of other legal mode of 
governance. 
4.5 Quasi-equity capital 
Titres participatifs (TP) are quasi-equity securities from outside investors. They are redeemable at the 
initiative of the issuer after a minimum of 7 years. They are not depreciable. Their remuneration has two 
components:  
(a) a fixed base which must be greater than 80% of the face value of the security, at an interest rate 
announced in advance, fixed or variable,  
(b) a variable proportional to a performance indicator of the co-operative. 
Sometimes the TP is not refundable. TP bears the risk of being repaid after the repayment of other loans, 
so it incorporates high cost of risk liquidation. Mauget and Hamon (1994) explain their limited success 
because such securities are illiquid. Furthermore, variable rate indexed to the performance of the co-
operative worried potential investors. So, interest rate must be high to attract investors. 
4.6 Other types of financial debts of co-operatives 
Since the Act of January 3, 1991, French co-operatives have the right to issue bonds. They can also use 
multiple option facilities (MOF). A bond is a debt security that gives the holder the right to a coupon 
which is a periodic interest payment paid by the issuer. It also gives the right to attend general meetings 
as an observer. The issuer decides to issue it as an OTC security or as a security traded on exchange. It 
decides its duration and method of repayment. Bond requires formalities with a financial market regulator 
(Autorité des Marchés Financiers in France): its administrative costs make it an instrument only suitable 
for large groups. 
Multiple option facilities (MOF) are multiple lines of credit options confirmed by a banking syndicate, 
often up to 7 years. These credits fit financial needs over time. Such flexibility makes MOF a suitable 
instrument for financing mergers and acquisitions quickly. 
5 Use of different financial securities by French agricultural co-operatives 
All agricultural co-operatives use shares, retained earnings and bank loans to finance their activities. 
However, the subscription of shares is a small proportion of financial securities used by French 
agricultural co-operatives. Co-operatives have limited use of quasi-equity using external funders. 
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Recently, several co-operative groups have opened their equity capital. 
5.1 Use of financial securities by co-operatives 
The opening of the share capital of co-operatives to external investors has attracted neither the banks nor 
the funds. Co-operative investment certificates (CCI) and savings shares (PSE) have not yet been used by 
agricultural co-operatives. Shares with particular advantages (PSAP) have not interested co-operatives, 
except for their co-op members. This may change with the development of industrial subsidiaries in the 
form of investor-owned corporations that also provide rights to produce. 
For TP, quasi-equity securities were issued in 1987 by Union Laitière Normande (ULN) and in 1989 by 
CANA (now named TERRENA). But the difficulties of the ULN in 1991 and its dissolution have highlighted 
the risk of non-repayment. In 2007, Tereos, a sugar co-operative in 2007, issued € 500 million 7-year 
bonds at 6.375% fully subscribed by one hundred investors. But French law prohibits the convertibility of 
bonds from co-operatives into shares. Generally these financial securities have interested neither co-
operatives nor external investors. 
5.2 Use of financial securities by co-operative groups 
In recent years, co-operative groups have opened the equity capital of their subsidiaries that are investor-
owned corporations and have also issued bonds. Several co-operatives set subsidiaries as investor owned 
corporations to host their processing units. Often a subsidiary is focused to a given manufacturing activit y 
in order to achieve economies of scale. The share capital of subsidiaries of co-operative groups has been 
open to financial institutions or co-op associates and employees: Advitam, Agrial, Axéréal, Laita, Sodiaal 
Tereos and Vivescia. 
Thus, the holding Advitam Investments opened its capital in 2012 to three financial institutions (Crédit 
Agricole, Unigrains and Sofiprotéol) and in 2013 to co-op members and employees. In 2007, Siclaé, 
subsidiary owning industrial activities of Vivescia co-operative group, opened its equity capital to 2,300 
shareholders: financial institutions, co-op members, co-op associates and co-op employees. In both cases, 
the subscription of co-op members was less than the amount expected, but it expresses the will to bring 
together co-op members and external financiers (of industrial co-op subsidiaries) by a common interest. 
Funds coming from co-op members and co-op associates (retired members, employees) are small 
compared to funding needs. But private investment funds (PAI Unigrains and, Crédit Agricole) and State-
owned financial institutions (Fonds Stratégique d’Investissement et Banque Publique d’Investissement ) 
have provided significant equity capital to subsidiaries of co-operative groups, including Sodiaal, Agrial, 
Axéréal and Vivescia. 
Two co-operative groups listed subsidiaries on stock exchange:  
1. Limagrain, the fourth largest world seed enterprise has listed its subsidiary Vilmorin & Co., a global 
leader in vegetable seeds, in Paris since 1993. 
2. Tereos, 4
th
 world sugar enterprise and 3rd European starch processor, has listed its Brazilian subsidiary 
Guarani in Sao Paulo since 2010.  
Bonds have been issued by subsidiaries of several co-operative groups since 2010: Agrial, Advitam, Siclaé- 
Vivescia and Sodiaal. Co-operative groups have opened the equity capital of their subsidiaries to external 
investors to meet their financial needs and to co-op members and employees to provide them an 
incentive for a common (financial) interest in industrial subsidiaries.  
6 Possible conflicts of interests between co-op members and external investors 
Lafleur (2012) and Chomel et al. (2013) infer that co-operatives have to take up challenges of equity 
capitalization and investment. Conflicts of interest among stakeholders may be a hurdle. They are rooted 
in the specificity of rights held by the different co-op stakeholders, co-op members on one hand and their 
partners in investor-owned corporations on the other hand. 
6.1 Economic logic in co-operatives and in investor-owned corporations 
Economic logics of co-operatives and investor-owned corporations differ:  
1. In a co-operative, the risky product to maximize is the value of agricultural products provided by the co-
operative members. Residual net income may be paid out to co-op members in proportion of their 
operating activities with the co-op. 
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2. In an investor-owned corporation, the risky product to maximize is the value of the share that is the 
financial capital provided by shareholders. Residual net income may be paid out to shareholders as 
dividends. 
This difference may cause conflicts of interest among equity shareholders (co-op members, co-op 
associates and external investors) in a co-operative or its subsidiaries incorporated as investor-owned 
corporation. 
6.2 Equity capital and conflicts of interest in co-operative 
For shares with particular advantages (PSAP) and savings shares (PSE), there is no conflict of interest 
between co-op members and co-op associates (who also are farmers) who first seek production rights by 
securing the sale of their agricultural production. 
For retained earnings, there is a potential conflict of interest between co-op members and co-op 
associates. The share of retained earnings out of net income are not be used to increase the price paid for 
agricultural products brought to the co-op. The decision about the amount or proportion of retained 
earnings is taken by the co-op board of directors mainly consisting of co-operative members. 
For co-operative investment certificates (CCI), there is a risk of conflict of interest between the 
remuneration of financial capital to shareholders and the remuneration of agricultural products to co-op 
members. The board of directors of a co-operative must arbitrate between maximizing prices paid for 
agricultural products and dividends paid for equity capital while dividend yield is limited to the TMO rate 
by law. 
6.3 Equity capital and conflicts of interest in co-operative group with subsidiary 
In case of issuance of shares by a subsidiary of co-operative, there may be a conflict of interest between 
shareholders from the co-operative and other investors. When the co-operative is a minority, priority is 
often given to returns to subsidiary shareholders in the form of dividends and potential capital gains.  
If the co-operative is predominant, there may be a conflict of interest between shareholders’ dividends 
and prices paid for agricultural products brought by co-op members whether these are direct 
shareholders or shareholders via the co-op. Arbitration is required. 
6.4 Quasi-equity capital and conflicts of interests 
No voting rights are attached to hybrid securities, whose remuneration is linked to the financial 
performance of the issuer. This is a source of conflict of interest in co-operative whose purpose is to 
maximize prices of agricultural products brought by co-op members.  
For hybrid securities like TP, the variable rate on the performance of the co -operative is in conflict with 
the maximization of prices paid for the agricultural products brought by co -op members. 
6.5 Financial debt and conflicts of interest 
For the debt, there is no risk of conflict of interest. Any co-operative must meet the service of its debt 
first.  
Tables 1 and 2 sum up the analysis of the different financial instruments, that may be used by co -
operatives. Table 1 provides the advantages and drawbacks of equity and hybrid capital of co-operatives 
and possible conflicts of interests among financial partners. Table 2 exhibits the advantages, drawbacks of 
financial debt instruments used by co-operatives. It also mentions that there is no conflict of interest 
among co-op members and debt holders. 
7 Propositions to solve conflicts of interest 
To prevent conflicts of interest identified between co-operative members and external financial investors, 
the mode of governance in co-operatives may include clear property rights of remuneration for each and 
a remuneration which does not depend on a political decision of co-operative members. It is also possible 
to strengthen the common interests of co-op members and outside investors, which is new. 
Clear property rights were mentioned by Coté (2001) and Chaddad and Cook (2004) to attract external 
financial investors. This involves the remuneration of every type of shareholder. For Thévenot(2011), 
Mauget (2011) and Chomel et al. (2013), the governance of every financial investor in a co-operative 
group differs from that of the co-operative. But this is not enough. Agricultural prices which do not 
depend on a political decision of co-op members are essential to prevent conflicts of interest and attract 
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external financiers. Arbitration is required between maximizing the return on agricultural product of co-
operative members and maximizing the return to external financial investors while retained earnings must 
be decided to reinvest. 
In a co-operative, a possible solution is to pay agricultural products at market price with clear reference 
before issuing financial securities accessible to external investors. In case of issuance of equity capital 
such as investment certificates (CCI), the agricultural products provided by co-operative members may be 
paid at market price. But co-op members exclude the possibility of getting a portion of the net income. 
And shareholders must agree on the amount of retained earnings to reinvest in the co -op. 
 
        Retained earnings to reinvest in the co-op 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agricultural products paid at market price   Equity capital paid at TMO rate or less 
 
Figure 1. Arbitration of returns and retained earnings in a co-operative 
 
For a co-operative group, arbitration may be different. In the case of an investor-owned corporation 
which is a subsidiary of a co-operative:  
(a) the co-operative maximizes the return on agricultural products supplied by co-operative members to 
the co-operative, including part of net earnings,  
(b) co-op subsidiary as investor-owned corporation maximizes the return on financial capital and pays 
agricultural products at market price. 
Often in a co-operative group agricultural products are only brought to specialized subsidiaries that are 
investor-owned corporations of the co-operative. The co-operative allows co-operative members to retain 
management power to manage economic efficiency and their overall remuneration better. Shareholders, 
who are co-op members, receive dividends and capital gains from subsidiaries that correspond to their 
economic efficiency. This solution enables co-operative members to arbitrate their own method of 
payment while maximizing the economic efficiency of each entity. An investor-owned corporation, which 
is a co-op subsidiary, may have to implement economies of scale in an area beyond the geographical 
business area of the co-operative where co-op members do farming. The co-operative can manage various 
industrial business by business subsidiaries with farmers who are shareholders in subsidiaries in addition 
to the co-operative itself. 
Furthermore, the amount or proportion of retained earnings must be clear when external financial 
investors enter a co-op or a co-operative group. 
 
Co-operative’s 
arbitration 
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Retained earnings to reinvest in the co-op 
        Dividend yield ≤ TMO rate 
 
 
 
 
Maximize agricultural product’ price     
 
 
      Dividend 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
Agricultural products paid at market price 
 
 
Retained earnings to reinvest in the subsidiary 
Figure 2. Arbitration of returns and retained earnings in a co-op group with subsidiary 
 
To strengthen the common interests of co-operative members and outside investors may be useful. It can 
help to cope with the risks of co-op members’ disinterest for industrial subsidiaries and latent conflicts. 
The equity capital of co-op subsidiaries as investor-owned corporation can be opened directly to co-op 
members and not only indirectly via the co-operative. This may facilitate the understanding of economic 
issues and partnership with external financiers.  
8 Conclusion and prospects 
Governance and economic projects of co-operative groups are often misunderstood by external financial 
investors. Potential conflicts of interest play a role in these misunderstandings and the low participation 
of external financiers. 
To prevent such conflicts of interest, governance can:  
(a) clarify property rights on the remuneration of each, 
(b) adopt a mechanism to pay agricultural products according to a mechanism that does not depend on 
decisions of co-op board of directors and the general assembly of co-op members, 
(c) strengthen the common interests of co-operative members and outside investors.  
Recent concern opens up new prospects for all stakeholders in co-op development. Arbitration may be 
necessary between 3 elements: retained earnings to reinvest in the enterprise, returns to equity capital 
and prices paid for the agricultural products. 
Co-operative’s 
arbitration External financial 
investors 
Subsidiary’s 
(investor-owned corporation) 
arbitration 
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Retained earnings to reinvest in the enterprise 
 
 
 
 
       
 
Market price paid for agricultural        Dividend yield to equity capital 
products brought by co-op members        brought by shareholders 
Figure 3. Three elements to arbitrate in co-ops and co-op groups 
 
Arbitration 
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Table 1. 
Equity and hybrid capital of co-operatives and possible conflicts of interests among financial partners 
Financial instrument  Advantages Drawbacks Possible conflicts of interests 
Share equity capital Reimbursement at the 
initiative of the co-operative 
within 5 years  
Fixed and limited 
remuneration. No capital-
gain to pay 
Low attractiveness because the rate 
of return is low, limited to interest 
rate of investor-owned corporations 
published by the Ministry of 
Economics (TMO) 
No conflict of interest 
Shares with particular 
advantages = Part sociale 
à avantage particulier 
(PSAP) 
Incentive related to 
subsidiaries of the co-
operative 
Limited rate of return inducing low 
attractiveness for co-op members 
No conflict of interest 
Savings shares = Part 
sociale d’épargne (PSE) 
Capitalization of retained 
earnings in the form of shares 
for co-op members 
low attractiveness for co-op 
members who do not receive money 
No conflict of interest 
Issuance of shares by co-
op subsidiary which is an 
investor-owned 
corporation 
Remuneration as dividends 
according to the economic 
efficiency of the subsidiary 
 Potential conflict of interest between shareholders from the 
co-operative and other investors, unless agricultural product is 
paid at market price 
Retained earnings No cash outflow 
No refund 
Surplus income can be set aside as 
retained earnings at the discretion 
of the Board 
Potential conflict of interest between co-op members and 
other investors because the excess income can be set aside at 
the discretion of the Board 
Co-operative investment 
certificate = Certificat 
coopératif 
d’investissement (CCI) 
Access to public capital 
without power (right to vote).  
No refund. 
Divergence of interest between the 
remuneration of CCI quasi- 
shareholders and remuneration of 
agricultural products to co-op 
members. 
Potential conflict of interest between the remuneration of CCI 
quasi-shareholders and remuneration of agricultural product 
to co-op members to co-op members 
Hybrid security = Titre 
participatif (TP) 
Access to public capital 
without power  
Reimbursable at the initiative 
of the issuer 
High interest rates to attract savings. 
Variable rates on the performance 
of the co-operative 
No liquidity of securities 
Potential conflict of interest between the remuneration of 
quasi-shareholders and remuneration of agricultural product 
to co-op members. The variable rate on the performance of 
the co-operative is in conflict with the purpose of maximizing 
prices maid for agricultural products supplied by co-op 
members 
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Table 2 
Debt instruments of co-operatives and potential conflicts of interest between stakeholders 
Financial 
instrument 
Advantages Drawbacks Possible conflicts of interests 
Bond No dilution of members’ power 
Financial instrument known and 
appreciated by financial investors 
Heavy and significant administrative 
costs: issuing bonds may only be 
appropriate for large groups  
Risk of negative financial effect of 
leverage.  
No possible convertibility into co-op 
share. 
No conflict of interest 
Bank loan No dilution of members’ power 
Financial instrument known and 
appreciated by financial investors  
Risk of negative financial effect of 
leverage 
No conflict of interest 
Multiple option 
facilities (MOF) 
No dilution of members’ power 
Flexible financial instrument 
Costly implementation by banks, MOF are 
more adapted to large groups  
Risk of negative effect of leverage and 
debt limit 
No conflict of interest 
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